Increasingly, gender researchers have acknowledged that to understand the critical issues affecting women and men in multicultural societies such as the United States, they must use an inclusive theoretical and methodological approach (e.g., Ghavami & Peplau, 2017; Hyde, 2014; Mays, Maas, Ricks, & Cochran, 2012; Shields, 2008). This approach must take into account not only how gender shapes experiences but also how other meaningful social group memberships and contextual statuses, such as race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, and life course stages (e.g., Ghavami, Katsiaficas, & Rogers, 2016), combine with gender to create experiences that are more than merely the sum of the statuses (Collins, 1999; Crenshaw, 1995; Mays et al., 2012). In addition and more important, there is an increasing recognition in the social sciences that because the meaning and mechanisms at play in social categories are politically and historically bound, the ways social categories combine at various developmental stages to shape outcomes must be understood within the context of power and privilege (e.g., Browne & Misra, 2003; Del Toro & Yoshikawa, 2016; Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016; Ghavami et al., 2016; Marecek, 2016; Warner, 2016). Scholars and social activists interested in change for those marginalized in society have called for a move beyond a single category or simple additive approach to understanding experiences and consequences of various simultaneous combinations of multiple social statuses in particular contexts using an intersectional framework.

Our goals in this chapter are threefold. The first is to present the early history of intersectionality, with a focus on the use of the method of social activism as the foundation of intersectionality development in addressing the marginalization of individuals, particularly African American women, whose multiple minority statuses have often rendered them invisible and unprotected. To that end, we begin with the genealogy of intersectionality, focusing on key figures who significantly shaped the evolution of contemporary intersectionality. A second goal is to highlight the potential transformation that can take place through the integration of micro-level psychological theory and research, as well as the transformation of psychological theory and research by using intersectionality approaches in its methods and analytic approaches. A third goal is to outline future aspirations for intersectionality—particularly as a method, tool, and approach—even returning to its early origins of social activism that can contribute to the advancing of intersectionality.

In the sections that follow, we first review the origins of intersectionality by focusing on the social, political, and historical contexts that shaped the social activism for the inclusion and protection of Black women and others in the United States. We then turn our focus to the ways in which intersectionality can be advanced using...
psychological theory and research on gender in the context of other social identities across various domains. Next, we consider how psychology as a discipline—with its distinctive intellectual and methodological orientation—can transform intersectionality. We close with a discussion of intersectionality’s potential for achieving equity and justice goals in theory, research, and practice as well as in public policy.

HISTORY OF INTERSECTIONALITY, BEGINNING WITH SOCIAL ACTIVISM AND THE FIGHT FOR PROTECTION AND EQUITY FOR U.S. BLACK WOMEN

The use of intersectionality in the field of psychology has increased significantly in recent years, particularly after the appearance of Elizabeth Cole’s (2009) article on intersectionality in the American Psychologist. A quick search in PsycINFO indicated that in the years before the publication of Cole’s article (e.g., from 1997 to 2009), only 180 publications focused on intersectionality, including 126 peer-reviewed articles, 34 book-related publications, and only 20 dissertations or theses. By contrast, a PsycINFO search of the years since her article’s publication, 2010 through 2016, revealed 696 peer-reviewed articles, 191 book-related publications, and 157 dissertations or theses. Cole’s (2009) article alone has been cited by 696 publications.

This recent interest in intersectionality in the field of psychology might suggest it is a new idea. However, this is far from the truth. The concept of intersectionality has a long history, spanning centuries of creative expression and social activism by and for Black women in the United States (e.g., Collins, 2000; Lewis & Grzanka, 2016). Some credit Sojourner Truth with having expressed the tenets of intersectionality in her attempts to call attention to the ways in which the obstacles to empowerment and well-being for Black women were both dissimilar and disproportionate to the experiences of Black men or White women (Salami, 2012). In the academy and beyond, intersectionality has deep roots in Black women’s feminist thought and scholarship across a wide range of disciplines, including critical legal studies, sociology, and gender and feminist studies (e.g., Beale, 1970; Bond & Perry, 1970; Collins, 1999; Cooper, 1892/1988; Combahee River Collective, 1977/1983; Crenshaw, 1989; King, 1988; Stewart, 1832/1987).

Coining of the Term Intersectionality

Black feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw is credited with coining the term intersectionality. In her landmark article, Crenshaw (1989) discussed how interlocking systems of power, privilege, and disadvantage at the intersection of race and gender uniquely position Black women in both the U.S. legal system and antidiscrimination law. In this work, Crenshaw highlighted the limitations of critical race theory and feminist scholarship in capturing the realities of Black women. To characterize how systems of oppression at the intersection of race and gender shape Black women’s experiences, Crenshaw offered the following analogy:

Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because she is in an intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination. . . . But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine which driver caused the harm. (p. 149)

Criticizing feminists and antiracist scholars for their focus on White women as targets of sexism and on Black men as targets of racism, Crenshaw (1993) argued that “focusing on the experiences of the most privileged members of the subordinate groups” (p. 383) renders the unique experiences of Black women invisible. In her groundbreaking work, Crenshaw challenged the “single-axis
framework” dominant in antidiscrimination law and argued that

[Black female plaintiffs] sometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they experience double discrimination—the combined effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black women. (p. 385)

Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2000) furthered solidified the concept of intersectionality in her influential book Black Feminist Thought. Emphasizing Black women’s unique position on the “matrix of domination”—or the complex and dynamic ways in which forms of oppression interlock—Collins asserted that “replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking ones creates possibilities for new paradigms” (p. 225). She further argued that placing African-American women and other excluded groups in the center of analysis opens up possibilities for a both and conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of penalty and privilege in one historically created system. In this system, for example, white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. Depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed. (p. 225)

Taken together, the combination of oppression and activism is the basis of intersectionality as a paradigm because “it captures how intersectional theory and methods attempt to both explain and transform systems of inequality” (Lewis & Grzanka, 2016, p. 39; see also Chapter 20, this volume). Intersectionality is recognized as a “signal contribution of feminist studies” (Cole, 2009, p. 171), and it is frequently invoked in feminist scholarship across various social science disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and political science (e.g., Cole, 2009; Hancock, 2007; McCall, 2005; Risman, 2004).

Social Activism as the Foundation of Intersectionality

Although the term intersectionality was coined in the late 20th century, these ideas have a longer history and played a significant role in the “herstory” of Black female activists in particular. Because for centuries Black women were banned from U.S. institutions of higher education, the contributions of early thinkers of intersectionality were found outside of the academy (Grzanka, 2014; Lewis & Grzanka, 2016) in such sites as abolitionist and women’s rights social activism, oral history, poetry, music, journalism, and creative nonfiction. Notable abolitionists and women’s rights activists such as Maria W. Stewart, Sojourner Truth, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett served as central figures in the genealogy of intersectionality but are often overlooked in studying intersectionality. Intersectionality was an early social activism approach—a method for creating and accomplishing social change not just for interrogating power and privilege but for becoming empowered in hopes of well-being and equity.

In a watershed moment in the birthing of intersectionality, Sojourner Truth famously asked “Ain’t I a woman?” to criticize patriarchy by advocating for the equal rights of women and to highlight the interconnectedness of racism and sexism. Drawing on her own painful experience as a Black woman, she invoked racialized womanhood to criticize the prevailing societal norms and legal protections that defined womanhood based on European American norms, excluding Black women and rendering their experiences invisible:

That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain’t I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered into
barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? (Truth, 1851/1985, p. 253)

In a similar vein, Maria W. Stewart used public speeches to draw attention to the interlocking systems of racialized gender oppression that uniquely affected Black women’s position in public spheres such as educational and professional careers. In her lecture “Why Sit Ye Here and Die?” to the New England Anti-Slavery Society, Stewart stated,

O, ye fairer sisters, whose hands are never soiled, whose nerves and muscles are never strained, go learn by experience! Had we had the opportunity that you have had, to improve our moral and mental faculties, what would have hindered our intellects from being as bright, and our manners from being as dignified as yours? . . . And why are not our forms as delicate, and our constitutions as slender, as yours? (Stewart, 1832/1987, p. 48)

At stake in these early debates was everything from access to higher education to voting rights. The activism of Truth and Stewart gave prominence to the plight of Black women in the United States and made clear the limitations of single-axis theorizing about womanhood and race. These early thinkers of intersectionality demonstrated that because in the United States gender is conflated with “White-ness” and race with “maleness,” Black women who are not the prototype of either social category are rendered invisible.

The writings and activism of Anna Julia Cooper more explicitly formalized the tenets of contemporary intersectionality, facilitating the uptake within the academy. Anna Julia Cooper, an educator, activist, and scholar, built on and extended early notions of intersectionality by focusing on the systemic and mutually constitutive nature of sexism and racism in the United States and the ways in which these interrelated systems of oppression uniquely marginalize those who are multiply oppressed. Attending to diversity within race on the basis of gender, Cooper (1892) urged Black male leaders to include Black women in their race-based agenda because “no man can represent the race” (p. 30).

Although gender and race figured prominently in early Black female feminists’ scholarship and activism on intersectionality, the role of other social categories was also emphasized. Illustrative is Anna Julia Cooper’s (1925) major work L’Attitude de la France à l’égard de l’esclavage pendant la Révolution, in which she tackled the racialized, gendered, and classed meanings of personhood and citizenship that are central in legal protections. In addition, foregrounding the lived experiences of Black lesbian feminist authors, artists, and activists, such as Barbara Smith (1983) and Audre Lorde (1984), the Combahee River Collective (1977/1983) was formed to address the political realities of Black lesbians, whose perspectives had been marginalized by traditional approaches to antiracism and sexism. For instance, the Combahee River Collective’s defining statement described its vision for Black feminism as opposing all forms of oppression—including sexuality, gender identity, class, disability, and age. The collective developed a multidimensional analysis approach to examining the lives of Black lesbians that was a “simultaneity of oppressions” that refused to rank or prioritize oppressions based on race, class, and gender—which was later embedded in the concept of intersectionality:

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. (p. 264)
Intersectionality Within and Beyond the Boundaries of the United States
Intersectionality has had far-reaching impact on a wide range of disciplines and has fundamentally shaped how researchers examine group identities and systems of power and inequality (Carbado, Crenshaw, Mays, & Tomlinson, 2013; Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013). Although the origins of intersectionality are rooted in the experiences of U.S. Black women, other feminist women of color both from within and outside of the United States have influenced the development of intersectionality (e.g., Carbado et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2013; Grzanka, 2014). For example, Anna Nieto-Gómez (1997) as well as Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherrie Moraga (1984) spoke to interlocking systems of oppression from the position of Chicana lesbian feminists. Contributions of Asian Americans such as Mitsuye Yamada (1976) and Jasbir Puar (2007) have also highlighted the pervasiveness and reach of the concept of intersectionality.

The travel of intersectionality across cultures beyond the U.S. borders has expanded the concept and its most fundamental goal of addressing empowerment (Salem, 2016). Salem (2016) questioned whether the articulation of intersectionality within the academy with its neoliberal focus is losing its ability to accomplish its goals. In addition, bringing to bear the distinct experiences of non-Western feminist women of color, the writings of Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1984, 1993), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), Chela Sandoval (2000), and many others foregrounded postcolonial criticism in their articulations of intersectionality.

Senegalese writer Awa Thiam (1978/1986), for example, described the plight of the African woman thus:

"The Black woman of Africa suffers three-fold oppression: by virtue of her sex, she is dominated by man in a patriarchal society; by virtue of her class she is at the mercy of capitalist exploitation; by virtue of her race she suffers from the appropriation of her country by colonial or neo-colonial powers. Sexism, racism, class division; three plagues. (p. 118)"

Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it is nevertheless important to emphasize and support the insights of Angela Y. Davis (1990) and other scholars into the ways national contexts can change the structures and meanings of oppression and the context of intersectionality. When intersectionality is exported to other parts of the world, for example, to women in Africa and the Middle East, researchers must understand and deconstruct the Western conceptions of gender relations that they bring to their analyses (A. Y. Davis, 1990; Salem, 2016). The works of scholars such as Angela Y. Davis (1990), Audre Lorde (1984), Maria Lugones (2007), Sara Salem (2014, 2016), or Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) and Ramón Grosfoguel (1999) caution one regarding bringing the U.S. colonial notions of feminism to how intersectionality can and should work outside the United States.

African feminist Molara Ogundipe-Leslie gives yet another perspective on the oppression of African women who for her metaphorically carry six mountains on their backs: tradition, backwardness to do with colonization, race, patriarchy, the global order, and last and most important herself (Salem, 2014). Given that the history of power and privilege, the nature of gendered relations, the cultural norms of interpersonal relationships, and even the expected length of life and expected right to well-being and empowerment differ so significantly across countries, caution is needed in holding one’s perspective of intersectionality as universal (e.g., Mahler, Chaudhuri, & Patil, 2015). It may be that the only universality of intersectionality is in its focus on activism and its praxis as a means of major social change.

Importance of Genealogy and History of Intersectionality
Definitions of intersectionality often share attributes such as an emphasis on gender, race, ethnicity, class, or sexuality as well as the power and privilege associated with these social categories to highlight “the vexed dynamics of difference and the solidarities of sameness” (Cho et al., 2013, p. 787). Although no consensus definition has emerged (e.g., Bowleg, 2012; Cole, 2009; Ghavami et al., 2016), scholars have generally agreed on three
main themes. First, each person simultaneously belongs to multiple social groups—there is no universal woman; each woman has a race, social class, sexual orientation, and so on. Second, the meaning of each social category is constructed through the lens of the others and filtered by their social categories. For example, people’s understanding of their gender is filtered through their race, sexual orientation, and social class, and their understanding of their race is filtered through their gender, sexual orientation, and social class. Third, because social categories “encapsulate historical and continuing relations of political, material and social inequality” (Cole, 2009, p. 173), the meaning and significance attached to a social category—and, in turn, the experiences of advantage or inequity in a category—will depend on the domain and the positionality of those social categories (Cho et al., 2013; Crenshaw, 1991; Dill, Nettles, & Weber, 2001; Ghavami et al., 2016).

Similarly, Salem (2014) analyzed the role of Angela Y. Davis’s work on feminist solidarity with women in Egypt to illustrate how positionality in context can redefine the privilege and power of an individual. While in the United States, Davis is multiply vulnerable as a function of her race/ethnicity, gender, and other characteristics. Yet, her positionality based on her multiple identity statuses changed when in Egypt. As a Western woman, representing the United States, a country that has played a central role in barriers to that country’s development, Davis’s positionality was that of privilege. Consequently, the meaning and significance attached to the combined social categories—and in turn, the experiences of advantage or disadvantage—depend on the context. Taken together, if intersectionality is to be used as a frame, method, or praxis for change, it is necessary to focus not only on the ways in which social categories combine to affect outcomes but also on the context of particular structures of power, privilege, and disadvantage.

Addressing Current Tensions in the Field of Intersectionality
Given the richness and complexity of intersectionality and its movement across time, structures, places, and disciplines, it is not surprising that scholars do not always agree on the theorizing and practice of intersectionality. Scholars across disciplines and geographic boundaries have engaged in lively debates about intersectionality—its definition, scope, and relevance—and have interrogated its theoretical and methodological merits. These tensions in the field have significant implications for the ways in which intersectionality and psychology can shape and transform one another.

Definition and Scope of Intersectionality
Hotly debated are issues surrounding the definition and scope of intersectionality. In fact, crafting a universal definition of intersectionality has been challenging (e.g., Alexander-Floyd, 2012; Hancock, 2013). For example, in a recent response to an article on theory and methods in intersectionality (Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016), Warner (2016) pointed out the long-standing debate on whether intersectionality should focus on “all members of multiple groups, including those in positions of privilege” (p. 342), such as White women. Proponents of the all-people perspective assert that because each person necessarily belongs to multiple social categories, studying those who are most privileged as well as those who are multiply disadvantaged is critical (e.g., Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016). By contrast, other scholars have argued that given that intersectionality was developed to explain the unique disadvantages at the intersection of marginalized statuses, its scholarship should be invested in individuals who are multiply marginalized. Illustrative is Choo and Ferree’s (2010) assertion that intersectionality ought to focus on the perspectives of multiply marginalized people, especially women of color; an analytic shift from addition of multiple independent strands of inequality toward a multiplication and thus transformation of their main effects into interactions; and a focus on seeing multiple institutions as overlapping in their co-determination of inequalities. (p. 131)

A second area of contention concerns whether intersectionality should conceive of social categories as aspects of both the individual as well as the
context (e.g., Else-Quest & Hyde, 2016). Although some have argued that both conceptualizations are necessary, others have contended that, within the context of intersectionality, social categories are necessarily social structures, not features of an individual’s identity (e.g., Hancock, 2013; Marecek, 2016). Recent legal scholarship is in line with the latter perspective, asserting that “conceptualizing social categories as social structures is fundamental to the study of intersectionality, and, in fact, future research on intersectionality should focus specifically on this quality of intersectional research” (Warner, Settles, & Shields, 2016, p. 174; Cho et al., 2013).

Communicating these “contested” areas when defining intersectionality is not only important for maintaining the nuances and complexities of intersectionality but also for preserving its radical potential (e.g., Collins, 2000; Warner, 2016). It is in its radical potential that change is most likely to occur. Differences in interpretations of intersectionality help to ensure that “an epistemologically dominant viewpoint deployed by researchers does not silence marginalized voices” (Warner, 2016, p. 343). For example, Warner (2016) demonstrated that Bilge’s (2013) and Alexander-Floyd’s (2012) analyses of the “whitening” of intersectionality provide a check on scholarship that undermines intersectionality’s focus on providing voices to marginalized groups.

Similarly, Warner cited that Puar’s (2007) analysis of how intersectionality has privileged U.S. Black women’s voices over those of other racial/ethnic minority women provides a check on ethnocentric perspectives of intersectionality. Attending to the contested areas of intersectionality shapes the enterprise of science, especially the process of knowledge production by and for racial/ethnic minority women and other marginalized groups (e.g., Collins, 2000; Few-Demo, 2014; Warner et al., 2016). The consequential nature of science in the lives of diverse or all genders and gender identities of women and racial/ethnic minorities and its association with injustices is illustrated by Kohlberg’s (1966) moral norms development, with research on boys establishing the universal model of moral norms until Carol Gilligan (1982) showed that girls have a “different voice.” The knowledge produced in the sciences is textured by inequality and often reflective of the advantages of power and privilege. In a recent study of National Institutes of Health funding that analyzed data from 7 years of R01 grant reviews, White women were as likely as White men to be awarded a grant but female Asian and Black PhDs and female Black MDs were less likely to get funding (Ginther, Kahn, & Schaffer, 2016). Feminist critiques have long held that the exclusion of women and minorities as the producers of science results in a science and universalities that can be highly racialized, gendered, and infused with assumptions of class (Weber & Castellow, 2012). It raises the question of who gets to tell the story and who is silenced? What is figural (and legitimate) and what is ignored background? Who has ready access to authority and who must explain themselves? And how such arrangements are sustained and what one must put at risk to challenge them?” (Travis, personal communication, 2016)

Taken together, although core features of intersectionality provide a road map for scholars, contested areas of intersectionality preserve its transformative potential.

Is Intersectionality a Theory, a Framework, or a Paradigm?
Not only do scholars differ on what true intersectionality is, they also differ on whether intersectionality constitutes an analytic approach (e.g., Cole, 2009), a framework (e.g., Settles, 2006), a theory (e.g., O’Brien, Blodorn, Adams, Garcia, & Hammer, 2015), a paradigm (Dubrow, 2015), or a combination of these (e.g., Hancock, 2007). Conceptual and methodological differences in what intersectionality is may reflect the interdisciplinary development of intersectionality (Cho et al., 2013). These differences may reflect the dual process of disciplines moving inward, toward, or adapting to intersectionality and of intersectionality moving outward and being adapted by other disciplines (Cho et al., 2013). We agree with Syed (2010) that “to use intersectionality in psychological research it may
be better understood as a framework, rather than a theory” (p. 61; see also K. Davis, 2008).

We contend that intersectionality is a framework grounded in the United States predominantly by critical race theory (Delgado & Stefancic, 1993, 2013) and feminist studies. Each of these perspectives argues that although those from marginalized groups all experience social marginalization, the quality, depth, and experience of that marginalization can and often does differ on the basis of which statutes and identities are at play in what social context (Delgado & Stefancic, 1993, 1995, 2013; Crenshaw, 1991). Even though Black women’s unique oppression in the United States catalyzed the resistance and activism that formed the foundation of intersectionality, its reach transcends the plight of this group. In fact, the “dialectic of oppression and activism . . . captures how intersectional theory and methods explain and transform intersecting systems of inequalities” (Lewis & Grzanka, 2016, p. 33) for any group. Basing intersectionality in critical race theory as well as in feminist scholarship provides a shared goal and basis of trust that further legitimizes intersectionality as framework with the potential to transform the field of psychology and its relevance for addressing marginalization of women and men. Cole (2009) also stated that intersectionality “is a paradigm for theory and research offering new ways of understanding the complex causality that characterizes social phenomena” (p. 179). Thus, one way to bring intersectionality into existing psychological theories can be to “insert psychological theories within the intersectionality framework to achieve a more nuanced understanding of identities” (Syed, 2010, p. 61). This approach allows for an analytic frame for highlighting the complexities of oppression (Syed, 2010) and as a way of making sense of interlocking societal oppression experienced by multiply marginalized groups. To the extent that placing psychological theorizing in the context of privilege, power, and the resulting cumulative advantage–disadvantage social relations (Cochran, Bjørkenstam, & Mays, in press) reframes or reconceptualizes psychological science, researchers will likely ask new or different questions from those asked in traditional approaches (Cochran & Mays, 2016).

### Can Intersectionality Transform Psychology’s Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Addressing the Effects of Social Marginalization?

There is much in the way of unrealized potential for effective psychological research and praxis through greater alignment of intersectionality’s conceptual and theoretical approaches and psychology’s methodological and analytic tools. Psychology, along with other disciplines in the social sciences, has increasingly recognized the need to grow theoretically and methodologically to capture the everyday experiences of people’s lives (Christensen & Jensen, 2012; Gullestad, 2006; D. E. Smith, 1987). This is particularly critical for capturing the experiences of diverse individuals whose day-to-day lives unfold within the context of sociostructural systems of oppression (Cho et al., 2013; Cochran & Mays, 2016; Goff & Khan, 2013). The essence of this transformation for psychology lies in the guidance provided by Collins (2015) in her citing of Cho et al.’s (2013) view of intersectionality as an analytical sensibility. Cho et al. argued that

> what makes an analysis intersectional is not its use of the term “intersectionality,” nor its being situated in a familiar genealogy, nor its drawing on lists of standard citations. Rather, what makes an analysis intersectional . . . is its adoption of an intersectional way of thinking about the problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power. (p. 795)

The profession of psychology has a long history of studies of social justice, particularly in counseling psychology, and of sameness and difference in relationship to power in social psychology. As a discipline, it is one of the strongest fields in the production of knowledge about self-identity and behavior, but it has for the most part failed to capture the essence of the multiple imputations of how social categories and their dynamics work simultaneously. Psychology’s success at truly capturing these experiences is related not just to getting the complexity of the social categories right but to, as a discipline, adopting research designs and analytic strategies that can explicate how those
various social categories and self-identities are responded to by others and how they are used in different social contexts (Cochran & Mays, 2016; Lumby, 2011; McCall, 2005; Shields, 2008; Warner, 2008). The challenge for psychology in its attempt to engage the production of new knowledge from intersectionality is whether it will accept new methods and approaches as equally legitimate (Collins, 2015). Historically, psychology has privileged quantitative approaches over qualitative; it often attempts to isolate discrete monocategorical comparisons using referents as a standard in statistical analyses (Harnois & Ifatunji, 2011). However, intersectionality demands comparisons of multiple forms of inequality that attempt to reproduce the complexity of interactions with social structures that capture how these different forms of inequality operate with some sense of logic in the everyday experiences of those who are socially marginalized (Collins, 2015).

In this regard, intersectionality theory offers several conceptual advantages, but methods for operationalizing its core features are still in their infancy (Lumby, 2011):

The challenge remains of how we might analyze the way in which two or more characteristics in synthesis influence the self-identity and the assumptions and responses of others in a fluid and changing process . . . the challenge is how to investigate adequately and understand the effects of “(social categories)” gender as moderated not only by individuals’ other characteristics but also mediated by the context in which they function. (p. 4)

To use Bauman’s (2004) words, “How do we analyze the impact of ‘liquid’ identity when the latter is in part self-created, in part imposed, constantly changing and fundamentally significant in terms of the life chances open to any individual?” (p. 12).

In the next section, we focus on the difficulties that arise when moving from using intersectionality as a frame for understanding individuals’ experiences to using methods that are intended to capture evidence of intersectionality effects (Celis & Mügge, 2015; Choo & Ferree, 2010; Christensen & Jensen, 2012; McCall, 2005). The ultimate goal of using an intersectionality lens is to identify recurrent patterns or sequences among or between structures of power and privilege that have their effects at the individual level (Christensen & Jensen, 2012, p. 110; Phoenix, 2011, p. 137; Phoenix & Pattynama, 2006, p. 187). However, because an individual characteristic, in and of itself, or even additive aggregates of individual characteristics do not necessarily capture the impact of marginalization, the way forward is thought to lie in how status variables such as race, gender, age, poverty status, or sexual orientation intertwine to create complex patterns of intersectionality effects.

Lumby (2011) pointed out that the experience of these individuals is moderated not only by their social categories but also “by the context in which they function” (p. 3). McCall (2005) took this a step further in her argument, showing that in studying complexity and diversity in the interrelations between these different categories of inequality, the assumption that race, gender, class, or other specific types of social categories function logically the same is incorrect. It has been argued that there is a “distinctive nature” (Squires, 2007, p. 162) in how various inequalities work at both the structural and the identity levels because they are all mediated by social structural power relationships (Christensen & Jensen, 2012; Phoenix, 2011). The extent to which methodological and analytic approaches can handle this type of complexity will vary by the extent to which there is authentic knowledge already provided by the voices of those who are marginalized of how these categories work and the number of categories in operation (Christensen & Jensen, 2012; Mays et al., 2012).

Can intersectionality contribute to these discussions in the field of psychology? If so, how? Cho et al. (2013) described the interdisciplinary development of intersectionality as consisting of both a centripetal process—disciplines moving inward, toward, or adapting to intersectionality—and a centrifugal process—intersectionality moving outward and being adapted by other disciplines. Through both processes, disciplinary conventions and intersectionality alike are challenged and expanded.
Contribution of Intersectionality to Psychological Theory

Theory is central in guiding psychological research—it shapes which questions are asked, from what perspective those questions are asked, how constructs are conceptualized, and for whom the results are relevant (Carbado et al., 2013; Goff & Khan, 2013). Existing psychological theories on the role of social identities in people’s lives are primarily designed around and in relation to individual categories of identity—race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, immigrant status, and so on. Most of these approaches draw from Eriksonian (Erikson, 1968) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) paradigms, ultimately establishing a theory and measure for a single identity (Cross, 1991; Egan & Perry, 2001; Phinney, 1992; Umaña-Taylor, Yazedjian, & Bámaca-Gómez, 2004).

Similarly, theories and research on the consequences of interpersonal and structural oppressions, such as the integrative model for the study of developmental competencies in minority children (García-Coll et al., 1996), the minority stress model (Meyer, 2003), and the phenomenology and ecological systems theory (Spencer, Dupree, & Hartmann, 1997), generally take into account the role of multiple identities. They rarely focus on how identities come together across different contexts to influence outcomes. Multiple identities are premised on the idea that individuals are members of multiple social groups—race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, social class, and so on. In this approach, the questions focus on how different identity pieces fit together, for example, how identities are ranked and aligned within an individual. Multiple identities assume that individuals, even those who belong to the same social groups, have distinct identity constructions in which same identities are more central than others (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Brett & Reitzes, 1999; Kiang, Yip, & Fuligni, 2008). Although identity intersectionality also acknowledges that multiple social categories coexist (e.g., race is filtered through the lens of gender), it is grounded on the premise that these categories work together to form unique social positions (e.g., Crenshaw, 1991; Shields, 2008). Therefore, intersectionality, as conceptualized by psychology, has thus far been less concerned with whether race, gender, or sexual orientation is more salient per se and more interested in how the understanding and experience come together in a particular context.

The use of an intersectionality framework can push researchers to concretely identify and theorize how context affects the ways social categories combine to produce experiences of advantage and disadvantage for individuals (Christensen & Jensen, 2012). To that end, Else-Quest and Hyde (2016) recommended that researchers frame social categories by two broad theoretical approaches emphasizing either the experience of the perception of social categories by individuals. Focusing on the experience of individuals, Ghavami and Peplau (2017) demonstrated that gender and sexual orientation combine differentially to affect the personal and social outcomes of lesbians and gay men across domains. For instance, although lesbians and gay men are both vulnerable to prejudice and discrimination because of their sexual orientation, the burden of bias often falls more heavily on gay men. In other domains, including drinking and smoking, by contrast, lesbians were shown to be at greater risk than gay men (Cochran, Bandiera, & Mays, 2013; Fallin, Goodin, Lee, & Bennett, 2015; Hughes, Wilsnack, & Kantor, 2016). To fully understand the life experiences of lesbians and gay men will require not only a careful examination of both gender and sexual orientation but also the assessment of the unique factors that shape the ways these social categories combine across different domains and the nature of the social context in which they occur.

Turning to how social categories shape perception, researchers have focused on social stereotypes—attributes that characterize members of a social group (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981)—to identify the underlying mechanisms that contribute to inequities in particular marginalized populations. Illustrative is the Ghavami and Peplau (2017) study that examined how gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation work together to affect urban, ethnically diverse adolescents’ stereotypes across three different domains: gender atypicality, intelligence, and aggression. Demonstrating the value of an intersectional approach, findings revealed that irrespective
of ethnicity, lesbian, gay, and bisexual students were viewed as more gender atypical than heterosexual students. In addition, irrespective of student sexual orientation, Asian students were viewed as significantly more competent (e.g., smart) than targets from any other ethnic group. Finally, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation combined to uniquely affect aggression. Taken together, the simultaneous consideration of multiple social categories in different domains allowed for the identification of which categories most strongly influence stereotypes in each of the three stereotype domains.

**Contribution of Intersectionality to Psychology’s Research Methods**

As subdisciplines of psychology, such as social, developmental, health, counseling, social cognitive, neuroscience, and others, have demonstrated the importance of context in determining how individuals from diverse racial, ethnic, gender, sexual orientation, immigrant, and socioeconomic backgrounds fare, the potential of intersectionality as an approach for framing research rises in importance. Currently, there is no guiding consensus about how to conduct empirical research using intersectionality. As a first step in thinking about the framing of psychological research, Cole (2009) put forth a general guide for researchers who want to use an intersectional framework. These guidelines were posed in the form of three questions. Below we discuss each of these questions.

The first question, “Who is included in this category?” and, by extension, “who is not in this category?” focuses on attending to diversity within social categories. The question serves an important role in raising consciousness about classification of single statuses, forcing researchers to recognize that diversity exists within each category selected. As a case in point, scholars have argued that because gender is conflated with “Whiteness” (Ghavami & Peplau, 2013) and because student samples in psychological studies are often primarily White (Sue, 1999), much of what is known about women in psychology is based on responses from young women who are White. Cole (2009) asserted that “an intersectional approach is an antidote to this erasure” (p. 172).

A second question, “What is the role of inequality?” focuses on how social and historical contexts intersect with power, privilege, and disadvantage, which are embedded in social categories to jointly shape perceptions and life outcomes (Mays et al., 2012). Cole (2009) argued that because “categories such as race, gender, social class, and sexuality do not simply describe groups that may be different or similar” but rather “the historical and continuing relations of political, material, and social inequity and stigma” (p. 171), psychologists must conceptualize social categories as reflecting social structural dynamics rather than primarily as characteristics of individuals.

Illustrative is Mays et al.’s (2012) work on HIV prevention among Black women in the United States. As the HIV epidemic in the United States progressed, African American women in the South found themselves at greater risk for HIV infection. Whereas most prevention efforts focused on reducing sexual and drug-related risk behaviors to levels seen in the general population, the reality was that the risk patterns for many of these women did not differ from those of women in general. Instead, they lived in a context in which there was greater risk of having an HIV-infected partner. What Mays et al. offered is an insight into how the social statuses of women who lived in the South combined with a set of conditions to confer greater risk for HIV infection for Black women. Being poor and underemployed and lacking education placed these women in a network of eligible marriage and relationship partners who had a higher prevalence of HIV infection. Although considerable effort has been spent in asking women to change their individual behavior, true change in the risk of HIV infection is best moderated by a series of factors that can include local laws and policies, quality of health care resources, sex ratio imbalance, incarceration rates of African American men, and education and employment opportunities (Mays et al., 2012). Not attending to these contextual factors that shape power, privilege, and disadvantages experienced by Black women paints an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the risk that drives their health status and health outcomes (Hankivsky, 2012; Hankivsky et al., 2014). Their perceived narrative becomes one in which some
women are blamed for engaging in normative patterns of sexual behavior while others are seen as having stronger wills or better morals (Mays & Cochran, 1988; Mays et al., 2012).

Mays et al. (2012) challenged the wisdom and viability of a prevention model for African American women that focuses solely on individual behavior change rather than considering the risk of behaviors in context. Taken together, and consistent with Collins’s (2000) “matrix of domination,” context works in concert with membership in multiple social categories to place individuals at various locations on the matrix, which affects their perceptions, experiences, and outcomes.

The final question proposed by Cole (2009) asks, “What are the commonalities across categories that are often viewed as deeply different?” (p. 175). Cole (2009) suggested that looking for commonality across differences entails viewing social categories as “reflecting what individuals, institutions, and cultures do, rather than simply as characteristics of individuals” (p. 175). In sum, these three questions have implications for every stage of the research process, from generating research questions to designing the study (e.g., what groups to include in the study) to formulating hypotheses (e.g., what groups to compare) to interpreting results. Below, we discuss methodologies and analytic approaches that can be use in psychological research.

Qualitative methods: Narratives and life stories. To date, much of intersectionality research has been essentially qualitative (Celis & Mugge, 2015; Hunting, 2014). Narratives, storytelling, ethnographies, biography, case studies, personal testimony, participatory action research, and oral traditions have served as the basis for many of the intersectionality studies, particularly studies in critical race theory (e.g., Bowleg, Teti, Malebranche, & Tschantz, 2013; Calasanti, Pietila, Ojala, & King, 2013; Diamond & Butterworth, 2008; Hurtado & Sinha, 2008; Settles, 2006; Tolhurst et al., 2012).

In fact, some intersectionality researchers have argued that qualitative research is essential to intersectionality because without it true knowledge of who belongs to the unit of analysis is not possible (Celis & Mugge, 2015). Cho et al. (2013) reminded researchers that if they are engaging intersectionality as the primary paradigm in approaching research, then the categories that they want to use in their analyses are “always permeated by other categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of power” (p. 795). The implication is that a particular identity or structural position in society cannot be accounted for by one social category alone, such as race, gender, or age (Celis & Mugge, 2015; Hunting, 2014). It is the combination of the intersections that evokes marginalization and in some instances grants privilege or advantage or not, depending on the context, the space, the time, and other factors that may not always be readily observable or known (Celis & Mugge, 2015). Because intersectionality implies that the identity and experiences of a person are formed not by one single social category but rather by a variety of identities, the narrow representations that researchers often use in traditionally conducted quantitative research are not flushed out sufficiently to understand what group dynamics need to be studied. The result is a lack of knowledge of what the unit or units of analysis needs to be. This becomes more complicated when one factors in that the production of knowledge, what researchers seek to accomplish, is influenced by their values, and those values drive what they prioritize to accomplish in the research (Hunting, 2014; Lumby, 2011, McCall, 2005). If one follows the tenets of intersectionality, it can transform how the research question is conceptualized and investigated and how the results are used to address social justice (Hankivsky et al., 2012; Hunting, 2014). Hunting (2014) described how qualitative approaches serve explorations of intersectionality:

Both intersectionality and qualitative methodology share assumptions about the context-bound nature of research, the importance of foregrounding voices of differently situated individuals, and the need to address power imbalances between researchers and those with whom research is conducted. . . . To do so reflexivity must become critical to qualitative research . . . examining
how research processes and knowledge production are shaped by the preconceptions, values, social positions, and interests of the research. (p. 1)

There are those who believe that, to situate both the research and the researcher within the fluidity of the social category dynamics of privilege and marginalization, intersectionality-informed qualitative research is necessary (Hunting, 2014; Shields, 2008). Shields (2008) argued that qualitative research is central to intersectionality:

The theoretical compatibility and historic links between intersectionality theory and qualitative methods imply that the method and the theory are always already necessary to one another. Intersectionality theory, by virtue of its description of [the] multidimensional nature of identity, makes investigation through qualitative methods seem both natural and necessary. (p. 36)

Several benefits to intersectionality-informed qualitative research fit within the conceptual framework of both intersectionality and the mission of psychology. Intersectionality-informed qualitative research that uses such methods as oral histories, narratives, or community-based participatory approaches gives participants a voice to provide insights into their experiences of power, structural interactions, and places of privilege in their lived experiences. This illuminates the communalities and differences that help to refine the unit of analysis in particular contexts (Hunting, 2014), particularly when it is done within social categories that are often assumed to be of one experience (race, gender, etc.).

Bowleg (2008) challenged research in which participants are recruited on the basis of demographics as not consistent with the conceptual tenets of intersectionality. Rather, when the dynamics of relations of power are part of the qualitative sampling, the research is more likely to highlight how the various social categories interact differently depending on the context and their combinations. Bowleg (2008) illustrated how this works in her often-cited article, “When Black + Lesbian + Woman ≠ Black Lesbian Woman.” In this article, Bowleg underscored the necessity of asking questions that move beyond demographics and allow participants to share the intersections in their lives that are salient to everyday life (Christensen & Jensen, 2012; Hunting, 2014), which is consistent with an intersectionality-informed qualitative approach.

One of the strongest arguments for intersectionality-informed qualitative research in contexts and populations whose lived experiences have not been captured is that the analytic strategy is not prescriptive. Analysis within an intersectionality-informed qualitative approach should be flexible, context specific, and accountable to participants (see Hankivsky, 2014, for a review of intersectionality-informed qualitative analysis).

Quantitative approaches. Although qualitative approaches are most often used in intersectionality research both within and outside of psychology, there has been increased attention directed to methods and statistical approaches that can provide testable conclusions while still capturing the liquidity of the relationships between social categories and privilege and power relations (Connelly, Gayle, & Lambert, 2016; Lumby, 2011; Rouhani, 2014). Here there are a number of challenges as well as exciting possibilities for quantitatively informed intersectionality research (Bauer, 2014; Bright, Malinsky, & Thompson, 2015; Dubrow, 2008; Jackson, Williams, & VanderWeele, 2016; Lumby, 2011; Maglo & Martin, 2012; VanderWeele & Robinson, 2014). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a how-to guide to designing and interpreting quantitatively informed intersectionality studies, but the published literature has a number of helpful discussions (see Bauer, 2014; Bowleg, 2008; Connelly et al., 2016; Hancock, 2007, 2013; McCall, 2005; Rosenthal, 2016; Rouhani, 2014; Scott & Siltanen, 2012; Spierings, 2012). The goal is to introduce some alternative perspectives on quantitative analyses in intersectionality to encourage further exploration of their value in transforming psychology and the conceptual theories of intersectionality. Rather than presenting a comprehensive discussion of all possible statistical approaches, we
focus our remarks on some of the challenges and benefits of moving from a conceptual theory of intersectionality to quantitative designs and statistical approaches.

Probably the two most common approaches used quantitatively to investigate differences between social categories (demographic or social statuses) are additive and multiplicative approaches (Bauer, 2014; Bowleg, 2008; Connelly et al., 2016; Hancock, 2007; McCall, 2005; Rouhani, 2014). The assumption of the additive approach is that the effects of social categories of interest are independent and mutually exclusive; when simultaneously present, each adds its effects to the outcome of interest. For example, early approaches to research on African American women often emphasized the “double whammy” of race and gender. In contrast, other approaches emphasized that the effect of statuses are multiplicative. For example, in “When Black + Lesbian + Woman ≠ Black Lesbian Woman,” Bowleg (2008) articulated the ways in which the everyday life of Black lesbians is not the sum of those statuses. Each category brings with it a particular valence that may not be equal at all times to the other statuses in how advantage or disadvantage occurs. That is, all statuses may have effects, but these effects are influenced (moderated) by the presence of other statuses.

Another important concept in thinking about how intersectionality works quantitatively is thinking of social categories as co-constitutive. This is the recognition that entities cannot only constitute other entities but that they can do so mutually. “Co-constitutive implies that causality can operate bilaterally. In other words entity A can have causal powers over entity B but entity B can also have causal powers in respect of A” (Easton, Gilchrist, & Lenney, 2012, p. 3). Although each of the social categories in intersectionality is measured separately, they often do not operate separately; instead, each operates to create and give meaning to the other. Some have argued that studies that focus solely on the voice of race-, ethnicity-, gender-diverse women or minorities are missing the essence of how the advantage or disadvantage works. Many of the U.S. studies that have engaged the co-constitutive approach have centered on the experiences of women and men who are Black or White; others have applied insights from intersectionality to other groups, including Asian American women (Lien, 1994), Asian American and African American sexual minorities (Bowleg, Huang, Brooks, Black, & Burkholder, 2003; Carbado, 2000; Chung & Katayama, 1998), and Latina immigrant women (Salgado de Snyder, Cervantes, & Padilla, 1990). Furthermore, most research has focused on the consequences of intersectionality for the individual, for instance, studying how being a double minority (e.g., a Black woman) compared with being a single minority (e.g., a White woman) affects psychological well-being, personal income, or educational attainment.

Less research has examined the understanding of underlying mechanisms, such as stereotypes, that contribute to inequalities in the social outcomes of intersecting gender and other social groups. A few studies have applied intersectionality to social stereotypes (e.g., Han, 2009; Landrine, 1985), but those studies have usually focused on stereotypes of Blacks and Whites (e.g., Devine & Baker, 1991; Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008). In one early study, Landrine (1985) examined the extent to which stereotypes about women applied equally to Black women and White women and also to middle-class and lower-class women (race unspecified). Responses from a group of White undergraduate psychology participants revealed that stereotypes about women differed significantly by race and by social class. White women and middle-class women were rated higher than Black women and lower-class women on feminine attributes such as being dependent, emotional, and passive. In contrast, Black women and lower-class women were rated higher than White women and middle-class women on a range of negative attributes, such as being dirty, hostile, and superstitious. Landrine concluded that “the stereotypes of white women and of middle-class women were most similar to traditional stereotypes of women” (p. 65).

The approaches of Mays and Cochran (2017) and Bowleg (2008) in the examination of stress and discrimination illustrate the use of a design that attempts to overcome separate categories of social identity by allowing race to be combined with additional social categories. In Bowleg’s study, for example, respondents were encouraged to use a “check all
that apply” approach to indicate the bases on which they thought discrimination might occur (e.g., gender, sexual orientation). This allowed the study to move beyond a focus on single factors as contributing to stress and discrimination. It also permitted investigation of combinations of social categories in addition to race/ethnicity as sources of advantage or disadvantage (Rouhani, 2014).

Mays and Cochran (2017), in a manuscript in preparation on discrimination and stress experienced by African Americans, used a strategy similar to that of Bowleg (2008). In this strategy, different social categories (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status) subjected to discrimination along with different types of perceived discrimination (race/ethnicity, education, socioeconomic status) in different contexts (employment, school, restaurants) and by perpetrators of different race/ethnicity and gender were included in the survey, allowing for testing of a number of different permutations. Unique in the study was the inclusion of the assessment of within-group discrimination based on socioeconomic status and skin color. Including these variables allowed for greater interrogation of within-group effects of specific types of perceived discrimination on the outcome of psychological distress.

An often-used analytic technique is the use a comparison model in which the referent to which all other categories in the model are compared conflicts with the principles of intersectionality research (Harnois & Ifatunji, 2011; Hunting, 2014). Often, this referent is White if the construct is race and male if the construct is gender. Constructing a comparison coding for two statuses (White vs. Black, male vs. female) simultaneously (e.g., White male) still results in only one referent category. Comparisons of the other categories to each other can be accomplished but exceed the available degrees of freedom (Connelly et al., 2016).

One strategy is to investigate evidence for statistical interactions (Connelly et al., 2016). This multiplicative approach typically adds two- and three-way interaction terms in regression models to explain the effects of intersecting social categories on a particular outcome (Bauer, 2014; Rouhani, 2014). Rouhani (2014) suggested that this leads to improvement in incorporating intersectionality principles because it moves beyond the additive, categorical approach traditionally used by quantitative researchers and considers the complex relationship between mutually constituting factors of social location and structural disadvantage. . . . This approach prompts researchers to acknowledge that the experience of race, class, gender and sexuality differs for individuals depending on their social location in the structures of race, class, gender and sexuality. (p. 4)

Although these methods are desired, they are often hard to employ when using secondary data sources, such as sample sizes of racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities; sexual orientation; and the use of socioeconomic status rather than socioeconomic position or age distribution are often limited. In many of the studies that we cited earlier in the chapter, intersectionality methods were used in conjunction with original data collection that incorporated a focus on intersectionality. Indeed, intersectionality in quantitative analyses works best when it is integrated throughout all of the stages of the research, particularly in defining the questions, determining known social categories and their classification, and achieving a sufficient sample size to support testing of interaction terms.

Mixed methods. Quantitative analyses are often less well suited to gaining depth in understanding the everyday lives of individuals than qualitative analyses, particularly as related to political structures and privileges (Dubrow, 2013, 2015). The advantage of the former approach is that it allows for explicit hypothesis testing. Furthermore, quantitative approaches often carry greater weight when serving as foundations for policy decisions. Mixed methods, an explicit combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, offer an opportunity to capture the strengths of both approaches (Hankivsky, 2014; Hankivsky & Grace, 2014). The study of “hyphenated selves,” for example, used multiple methods in its investigation, including
identity mapping, focus groups, interviews, and surveys (see Katsiaficas, Futch, Fine, & Sirin, 2011; Sirin & Fine, 2008; Sirin et al., 2008; Zaal, Salah, & Fine, 2007). By gathering narratives, the researchers captured the complexity of individuals’ intersectional identities (Katsiaficas et al., 2011).

Ghavami and Peplau (2013), for example, used a mixed-methods approach to assess and compare the extent to which stereotypes of women and men differ by race and ethnicity. Ethnically diverse undergraduates each generated attributes for one of 17 groups: Asian Americans, Blacks, Latinos, Middle Eastern Americans, Whites, men, women, or 10 Gender × Ethnic groups. Grounded in intersectionality theory (Crenshaw, 1995), Ghavami and Peplau then tested and found support for three of their hypotheses. First, consistent with the intersectionality hypothesis, Gender × Ethnic stereotypes contained unique elements that were not the result of adding gender stereotypes to ethnic stereotypes. Second, in support of the ethnicity hypothesis, stereotypes of ethnic groups were generally more similar to stereotypes of the men than the women of each group. Third, the gender hypothesis postulated that stereotypes of men and women would be most similar to stereotypes of White men and women, less similar to those of ethnic minority men and women, and least similar to those of Black men and women. These findings are consistent with intersectionality theory (e.g., Crenshaw, 1995) and the analysis of intersectional invisibility (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Ungar & Liebenberg, 2011), which suggests that ethnicity is conflated with maleness and gender with Whiteness. As a result, the characteristics of ethnic minority women are less well represented than those of ethnic minority men in global stereotypes of their gender or ethnic group.

Results from these studies underscore that methods to study the effects of intersectionality also call for research methods that are themselves intersectional, combining multiple methods within a single study design (Harper, 2011). It is critical that researchers give serious thought to how their analytic strategies match their conceptual or framework approach. As researchers think through “big data” approaches to capturing everyday life or lived experiences, such an approach for understanding intersectionality is worth considering.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ENVISIONING PSYCHOLOGY’S UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION IN ADVANCING INTERSECTIONALITY

To date, much of the discussion surrounding psychology and intersectionality has focused on the contribution of intersectionality to psychology—how it can transform theory and methods and, by extension, how human behavior and mental processes are conceptualized and understood. Significantly less focus has been on how psychology can contribute to the evolution of intersectionality as it moves across disciplines. In fact, intersectionality has been generally silent on the process by which individuals develop an understanding of how systems of oppression and privilege and their location in these intersectional spaces constrain their individual choices.

At first blush, shifting the focus to individuals’ personal sense of identity and intersectionality in their own lives may seem at odds with the foundations of intersectionality (Syed, 2010). However, we believe that incorporating how individuals develop an understanding of their social group memberships and internalize its significance and meaning within their life course and various contexts can enrich understanding of the ways in which social structures and power relations can affect people’s view of opportunities and barriers. A personal understanding of how individuals’ multiple identities are interrelated is a gradual developmental process (Azmitia, Syed, & Radmacher, 2008).

Taking a developmental perspective and asking when and what individuals learn about social groups (Aboud, 1988; Martin & Ruble, 2010; Quintana & McKown, 2008; Slaughter-Defoe, 2012) can shed light on the process by which intersectional identities and social locations affect people’s lives. As an example, African American or American Indian parents may choose to share histories of oppression as a method for teaching children about the physical dangers of racism and oppression. Identities become shaped by years of structural oppression
that influence perspectives on opportunities in society. Research with children and youth has provided a critical starting point. For instance, studies have shown that children become aware of race and gender and are able to categorize themselves and others using racial and gender labels before they start school (e.g., Katz & Kofkin, 1997; Kelly et al., 2005; see Martin & Ruble, 2010; Slaughter-Defoe, 2012). A recently conducted study found that infants less than a year old, who have yet to learn language, notice racial differences when looking at adult women of different ethnicities (Singarajah et al., 2017). Because childhood is marked by cognitive advancements and social experiences (such as schooling and peer relations), children are afforded new ways of thinking about the self and others using race, ethnicity, and gender concepts (Akiba, Szalacha, & García Coll, 2004; Bennett & Sani, 2004; Marks, Szalacha, Lamarre, Boyd, & García Coll, 2007; Ruble et al., 2004). During childhood, children also become increasingly aware of the social status of their own and other social groups as well as of the stereotypes and behaviors that accompany them (Halim & Ruble, 2010; Killen & Stangor, 2001; McKown & Weinstein, 2003). Children’s awareness of group stereotypes marks a notable shift in their attention to the social status differences and implications of social group membership (e.g., Halim, Ruble, & Amodio, 2011). An understanding of these social group processes is integral to how children come to put together their multiple identities (e.g., Brown, 2006; Brown & Bigler, 2005; Killen, 2007). In addition, studies that take a developmental perspective on the development of sexual minority status have provided critical insights into the meaning of being gay, lesbian, or transgender in the context of being a racial/ethnic minority (Ghavami & Peplau, 2017) or of being a sexual minority and living in the South in the context of being rich or poor. Researchers have moved from using narratives of the lives of sexual minorities to large datasets, which help them to examine simultaneous statuses (Calzo, Antonucci, Mays, & Cochran, 2011; Katz-Wise et al., 2016).

Taking a developmental or life course perspective raises several important yet unaddressed questions. Although intersectionality scholars fiercely debate the definition and scope of intersectionality, discussions of whether and how definitions of intersectionality might differ across development are largely absent. For example, because the overwhelming majority of studies taking an intersectional perspective have focused on adults, researchers do not know what intersectionality may look like for children. Drawing from theories of cognitive development, children’s classification skills may precede intersectionality thought. That is, for children to think about the self and others using an intersectional lens, they must be able to classify individuals along at least two dimensions simultaneously. The absence of an explicit articulation of what intersectionality looks like across development limits the depth and quality of intersectionality research. These theoretical limitations can have significant downstream consequences for practice, such as designing prevention and intervention programs that acknowledge differences in the experiences of diverse individuals.

Some scholars have also criticized intersectionality on the grounds that it does not adequately attend to the shifting and fluid nature of identities (Warner & Shields, 2013). This criticism is particularly relevant in the domain of gender—how it is conceptualized, analyzed, and understood. A first example concerns the experiences of transgender individuals. The majority of research, in both developmental and social psychology, has conceptualized gender as a binary—male and female. This binary notion of gender is also reflected in theorizing about how children come to understand their gender. In fact, one the hallmarks of early childhood development is gender constancy—the idea that not only do children become aware of their gender but also that they recognize its stability and constancy across time and context. This constancy has long been held as a necessary milestone for social identification and intergroup relations.

Now consider the experiences of individuals who are transgender and often report some degree of mismatch between the gender assigned to them at birth and their own subjective understanding and experience of gender. Although some studies have suggested that the gender identity of transgender individuals may not be constant and is defined by...
change, other studies have shown the opposite. For example, in a recent study Olson, Key, and Eaton (2015) demonstrated that transgender children’s understanding of their own gender was statistically indistinguishable from that of cisgender children of the same gender identity. These emerging findings suggest that gender identity could be constant for some transgender individuals even though it might not match the gender assigned to them at birth. There is also the possibility that for other transgender individuals, gender identity may actually be fluid. A second example concerns the experience of sexually fluid women. Studies have demonstrated that features of women’s sexuality are often fluid and variable over time. Lisa Diamond (2008) has shown that, among sexual minority women, sexual orientation identities as well as sexual and romantic attractions and behaviors with men and women shift over time. If some aspects of a woman’s sexual orientation are fluid, then her location on the “matrix of domination” will not be fixed. Consequently, the meaning and significance of specific social categories and intersectional locations may change over time and place. The implications of this dynamic nature of identities are important for the field of intersectionality.

Finally, psychological methods can augment methodology in intersectionality. To assess intersectionality in the everyday lives of individuals, researchers will likely need a range of methods, experimental and naturalistic, explicit and implicit, qualitative and quantitative. Given what is known about human development, social, cognitive, and behavioral—researchers then need to triangulate on a variety of methods that are age appropriate and sensitive to the context of the research. For example, in-depth observational and interview studies may be uniquely necessary and appropriate for children who are still developing their understanding of their social group memberships. Interview methods would allow researchers to probe directly into how children understand and experience the nuances of multiple identities and could prove insightful and useful for developing intersectionality measures. Methods must be open enough to understand how individuals are constructing identities across situations and contexts.

The early history of intersectionality clearly underscores the importance of social activism in addressing the marginalization of individuals whose minority statuses often render them invisible and unprotected in the eyes of the law and social policies. What does social activism in the spirit of intersectionality look like today? The modern-day version of this social activism designed to not only empower Black women but also to protect their lives comes in the form of Black Lives Matter. Black Lives Matter, a call for social organizing, has attempted to integrate the multiple statuses that exist within the Black community, particularly that of the marginalized.

Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a tactic to (re)build the Black liberation movement. (Black Lives Matter, n.d., para. 3)

In addition, as part of the African American Policy Forum, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw has organized a series of town hall meetings in cities across the United States to bring the message that the lives of Black women matter. This tool of organizing under an inclusive umbrella is designed to address major policies to increase the empowerment and well-being of Black women as a population. Furthermore, social activism today uses the tools of technology to connect across boundaries and statuses, and methods for real-time analyses are greatly enhanced and growing both in effectiveness and in the sophistication of tools used to collect data through social media.

The one area of psychology that teaches the use of social activism as a method for research and change at the macro- and meso-system levels is counseling psychology, with its well-articulated focus on social justice (Lee, Smith, & Henry, 2013; Lyons & Bike, 2013). Counseling psychology is among the few subdisciplines in psychology in which social justice in the form of policy advocacy and structural change activism are taught
as core elements of good research and practice (Arredondo & Perez, 2003; Lee et al., 2013). Counseling psychology’s well-developed macro-level social justice intervention agenda, centered in the social–political domains in which real policy change occurs, is primed to create practitioners, theoreticians, and researchers who can lead the transformation of psychology (Lee et al., 2013). Lee et al. (2013) outlined the ways in which social activism methods can and should be used to achieve social justice goals. The interplay between the macro level and engagement of the individual at the micro level is seamless and well explained, as “counselors . . . become systematic change agents who ‘challenge social, cultural, or economic barriers to optimal psychosocial development’ (Lee & Rodgers, 2009, p. 284). . . . Interventions seek to change governmental and political systems so that they are more just and equitable” (Lee et al., 2013, p. 77).

Unlike any other area of psychology, the pedagogy in counseling psychology trains its members to engage a practice and research agenda in which counselors act as agents of change in systems that affect their clients (Toporek, Lewis, & Crethar, 2009). In a curriculum focused on social justice, there is an emphasis in research training on the “subjectively defined needs of marginalized populations” (Lyons & Bike, 2013, p. 2) and on how power and privilege are factors in individual psychological distress. Counseling psychology advocates for a curriculum in which its members’ skill sets are aligned with the tenets of intersectionality and, most important, are designed to move intersectionality from a conceptual–theoretical asset to that of social activism in support of major policy change on behalf of their clients (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013; Lee et al., 2013). Fassinger and Morrow (2013) highlighted the work of counseling psychology research training and the importance of understanding such details as participants’ cultural histories; relevant laws and policies; values, norms, customs, and traditions of participants and their communities; and the sociopolitical climate as viewed from participants’ perspectives. The researcher should possess culturally competent communication skills (including language fluency) and demonstrate respect for participants and their cultures. (p. 71)

These are all skills that increase the likelihood of practice and research driven by the tenets of intersectionality. In counseling psychology, the “basic goals of social justice research to examine and understand systematic social inequities that privilege or marginalize particular groups of people, and to work toward social change that results in the re-distribution of power and resources” (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013, p. 75) map well onto the transformation of psychology by embracing intersectionality.

We agree with Rosenthal (2016) that it is in the best interests of all of psychology, as a profession, not just counseling or community psychology, to fully embrace intersectionality as a way to engage our science, practice, and public interest efforts to critique and change societal structures that fail to support well-being. The real question for psychology is whether there is the courage to change and the will to embrace intersectionality. In the current political landscape, leadership in psychology that could illuminate the everyday lives and lived experiences of individuals who are socially marginalized would be a benefit to all.

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